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LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION IN
HOUSING: THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION
Michael H. Schill*
The year 1995 marks the fortieth anniversary of the New York
City Human Rights Commission. Founded in 1955 by Mayor Fi-
orello LaGuardia, the Commission began its life primarily dedi-
cated to promoting open housing for New York's racial and ethnic
minorities. Two years after it was created, the Commission took on
an important role in enforcing the nation's first law prohibiting dis-
crimination in the private housing market. Although housing dis-
crimination cases now constitute only a small proportion of the
Commission's total workload, the battle against housing discrimi-
nation remains an important part of the Commission's mandate.
This article examines the problem of housing discrimination in
New York City as well as the role of the Human Rights Commis-
sion in fighting illegally discriminatory practices. Part I describes
the evidence demonstrating housing market discrimination and ex-
amines the harmful impact these practices have on many New
Yorkers. Part II examines the New York City Human Rights Com-
mission's battle against housing discrimination from its founding in
1955 to the present day. As part of this analysis, New York City's
Human Rights Law is compared with analogous protections en-
acted by the State of New York and the federal government. Data
on all housing discrimination complaints filed with the Commission
in 1992 and 1993 is also studied. Finally, Part III of the article com-
ments briefly on how the Commission can face the challenges of
the future in seeking to break down barriers to residential mobility
and integration.
* Professor of Law and Urban Planning, New York University; Director of the
New York University School of Law Center For Real Estate and Urban Policy. I
would like to thank Kammie Gormezano, Benjamin Scafidi and Simone Andrews for
their research assistance. This article represents my own views and not necessarily the
views of the members of the Center For Real Estate and Urban Policy's Board of
Advisors.
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I. Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in the Housing Market
In enacting the pathbreaking Fair Housing Practices Law in
1957,1 the New York City Council primarily sought to outlaw dis-
crimination in housing based upon racial or ethnic characteristics.2
Of particular concern were acts against black and Hispanic
homebuyers and renters.3 Although the scope of the City's human
rights law has expanded greatly to encompass as protected groups,
among others, women, families with children, people with mental
and physical handicaps and gay persons,' the two largest categories
of complaints continue to allege discrimination based upon race
and national origin.5 This part discusses recent evidence of dis-
crimination in the housing market directed against black and His-
panic home buyers and renters, followed by an examination of
some of the consequences of these discriminatory acts.
1. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text for a description of the Fair
Housing Practices Law.
2. In addition to race, color, national origin and ancestry, the Act also proscribed
discrimination based upon religion. In light of the leading role played by the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee in the passage of the Act, it
is likely that the Council also was concerned with discrimination against Jewish house-
holds. At the time the Act was passed, however, discrimination against Jews in the
housing market was considerably less frequent than discrimination against blacks and
Hispanics. Nevertheless, several reports indicated that Jews faced considerable diffi-
culty in purchasing apartments in several exclusive cooperative apartment buildings
on Manhattan's upper east side. See NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK
MOYHIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS,
ITALIANS AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CITY 160 (1963); Joseph B. Robison, Fair Hous-
ing Legislation in the City and State of New York, in THE POLITICS OF FAIR-HOuSING
LEGISLATION: STATE AND LOCAL CASE STUDIES 27, 32-33 (Lynn W. Eley & Thomas
W. Casstevens eds., 1968); Housing Discrimination Against Jews, 2 RIGHTS 41, 41
(1959). During the first three years following the law's enactment in 1958, 81% of
complainanants were black, 8% were Puerto Rican and only 3% were Jewish. See
Harold Goldblatt & Florence Cromien, The Effective Social Reach of the Fair Housing
Practices Law of the City of New York, 9 SOC. PROBS. 365, 366-67 (1962).
3. New York, N.Y., Local Law 80 § X41-1.0 (Dec. 30, 1957) (noting that segrega-
tion in housing often results in racial segregation in public schools and other public
facilities which is "condemned by the constitutions of our state and nation").
4. See infra text accompanying notes 86-99.
5. See infra text accompanying note 146.
6. My focus in this part on discrimination against blacks and Hispanics is not
meant to suggest that discriminatory acts aimed at these two groups are the only or
even the most important problems to be addressed by the Commission on Human
Relations. Insufficient data prevents me from thoroughly examining the scope and
consequences of other forms of housing discrimination. The absence of this data may
nevertheless have certain normative implications.
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A. Evidence of Discrimination Against Black and Hispanic
Households
The level of discrimination7 practiced by participants in the
housing market is often extremely difficult to identify and assess.8
It is the unusual case in which an owner, real estate agent or lender
will tell a prospective purchaser or renter that he or she is being
rejected because of his or her race or ethnicity. It is even more
rare for the discriminating party to make these reasons known pub-
licly. Social scientists, therefore, must develop research methodol-
ogies to ferret out evidence of discriminatory actions.
One indirect method of learning about the likelihood of racial or
ethnic discrimination in a particular housing market is to examine
levels of race segregation. No matter what level of analysis one
chooses, recent data show extremely high levels of racial and ethnic
segregation in the United States. According to the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing, 22% of the residents of American central
cities are black compared with only 7% of the suburban popula-
tion.9 In the New York metropolitan area, 29% of the residents of
New York City are black compared to 11% of the population in the
rest of the metropolitan area. 10 Similar disparities exist for His-
panic households.1
Alternative indirect methods devised by social scientists to mea-
sure spatial concentrations of population within metropolitan areas
also demonstrate high levels of segregation in American metropoli-
tan areas in general, as well as in New York. The most commonly
7. For purposes of this article, "discrimination" is defined as the refusal by an
owner, landlord, lender or real estate agent to make available housing or housing-
related services because of a characteristic of the prospective tenant or purchaser
when the use of such characteristic by the owner, landlord, lender or real estate agent
is proscribed by law.
8. Individual acts of discrimination can be identified from litigated cases or inves-
tigations by fair housing enforcement organizations. Nevertheless, given their anec-
dotal nature, these reports cannot furnish estimates of the overall level of
discrimination in the housing market.
9. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990
CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS UNITED STATES
7 (1992).
10. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERIS-
TICS FOR CENSUS TRACTS AND BLOCK NUMBERING AREAS NEW YORK-NORTHERN
NEW JERSEY-LONG ISLAND, NY-NJ-CT CMSA 1, 2, 391-92 (1993).
11. With respect to the United States, 14.8% of all residents of central cities are
Hispanic compared to 7.6% of all suburban residents. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
supra note 9, at 7. Similarly, 24% of all residents of New York City are Hispanic
compared to 9.2% of the residents of the New York metropolitan area. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 1, 2, 546-47.
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used measure of segregation is the index of dissimilarity which rep-
resents the proportion of a metropolitan area's population that
would have to move to achieve an even distribution of minority
group members throughout the metropolitan area. A high level of
segregation is generally indicated by an index value in excess of 60.
Among the twenty-three metropolitan areas in the United States
with the largest black populations in 1990, the average index of
dissimilarity was 74.5, down slightly from 78.8 in 1980.12 In New
York, the index value in 1990 was 78, unchanged from 1980.11 For
the twenty metropolitan areas with the largest Hispanic popula-
tions in the United States, the average index of dissimilarity was
48.9 in 1990.14 In New York, the index took on the value of 54.15
Thus among blacks, the level of segregation in the New York met-
ropolitan area is high in absolute terms, although not terribly
higher than the national average. Segregation among Hispanics,
however, is considerably more moderate.
High levels of segregation, while suggestive, do not necessarily
imply high rates of racial and ethnic discrimination in the housing
market. In New York, as well as the nation, a correlation exists
between income and race or ethnicity. Black families earn, on av-
erage, one-third the income of white families in New York City; the
disparity between Hispanics and whites is even greater.1 6 There-
fore, because low cost housing is frequently located in certain geo-
graphic areas of the city, one might expect to find that lower
incomes contribute to segregated housing patterns among black
and Hispanic households. Nevertheless, much research suggests
that the effect of income disparities among blacks, Hispanics and
whites on housing segregation is likely to be relatively small. For
example, one set of studies predicts the expected location of house-
holds in a city based upon family characteristics, housing prices and
incomes and then compares these locations against actual residen-
tial patterns to determine whether racial discrepancies persist. In
virtually all of these studies, income, housing and individual char-
12. See JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING
COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 112 (1995).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 113.
15. Id. The 1980 dissimilarity indices for Hispanics in the U.S. and New York
were 48 and 55, respectively. Id.
16. The median income of white families in New York City in 1989 was $61,913.
For black families the median was $20,850 and for Hispanics $18,378. See UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION AND HOUSING 2632, 2869, 3181 (1993).
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acteristics predict only a small part of the geographic distribution
of minority households. 17 Another set of studies computes sepa-
rate indices of dissimilarity for different income groups as a means
of investigating whether segregation declines as household income
increases. These studies also find that income apparently has only
a small impact on levels of segregation. Higher income blacks and
Hispanics tend to be almost as segregated as their lower income
counterparts. 8
A more important cause of high levels of racial and ethnic segre-
gation, and one which is certainly more difficult to assess, may be
individual preferences. Empirical studies repeatedly show that
blacks and whites have different preferences for the racial composi-
tion of their neighborhoods and that these different preferences
may give rise to segregated residential patterns. Whites typically
prefer neighborhoods which either have no black residents or only
a few. Blacks, on the other hand, typically prefer integrated com-
munities in which the number of black residents is roughly equal to
the number of white residents. 19 These different preferences for
neighborhood racial composition are likely to be one explanation
for the rapid racial transformation experienced by many inner city
communities since the end of World War II.2° Although the prefer-
ences that give rise to neighborhood change and re-segregation
might be based on racial prejudice or bigotry, segregation may oc-
cur without a single illegal act of discrimination.2'
17. See John E. Farley, Race Still Matters: The Minimal Role of Income and Hous-
ing Cost as Causes of Housing Segregation in St. Louis, 1990, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 244,
249-51 (1995) (presenting data for St. Louis); John F. Kain, Housing Discrimination
and Black Suburbanization in the 1980s, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING
PATERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 68, 78 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987) (describing
simulations in Cleveland); Karl E. Taeuber, The Effect of Income Redistribution on
Racial Residential Segregation, 4 URB. AFF. Q. 5, 7 (1968) (describing results in
Cleveland).
18. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEG-
REGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 84-88 (1993).
19. See Reynolds Farley et al., Continued Racial Residential Segregation in Detroit:
"Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs" Revisited, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 1, 27 (1993).
20. The phenomenon described is typically called "tipping." See Thomas C. Schel-
ling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972).
21. Of course, illegal acts might be part of this neighborhood transformation. In
many well documented cases, real estate agents prey upon white prejudice and fear to
accelerate the process of neighborhood racial change. In a process called "blockbust-
ing," the agent typically sells one or two homes in an all white neighborhood to mi-
nority homebuyers. He or she then solicits other homeowners to sell their homes
before the neighborhood "changes." For a discussion of blockbusting activities in
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Discrimination in the housing market is not limited to home sell-
ers and real estate agents. In recent years, several studies have ex-
amined and tried to measure the level of discrimination in the
home loan mortgage market. Data released since 1989 pursuant to
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)22 have repeatedly
shown large disparities in loan rejection rates among white, black
and Hispanic applicants. For example, in 1993, 17.4% of all black
applicants were rejected in the New York metropolitan area com-
pared to 10.7% of white prospective borrowers. Among Hispanic
loan applicants, the rejection rate was 16.9%.23 Nevertheless, dif-
ferential rejection rates, like disparate segregation levels, only sug-
gest the possibility of discrimination, but do not prove it. Financial
institutions may reject minority loan applicants at higher rates than
whites not because of discriminatory motives, but because factors
contributing to the risk of default, such as lower assets or income,
are correlated to race.
The challenge of identifying discrimination based upon loan ac-
ceptance and rejection data is great given the number of factors
that might influence a bank's decision to extend credit. The most
comprehensive study completed to date was conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Boston in 1990.24 The authors of this study
obtained data from member banks which permitted them to con-
trol a wide array of individual, property and neighborhood risk
variables. They concluded from their analysis that, even after con-
trolling for these factors, the probability of rejection among blacks
and Hispanics was more than 50% higher than for white appli-
New York and efforts by the Commission to fight the process, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 102-110.
22. Pub. L. No. 94-ZOO, Title III, 89 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1994)). Prior to 1990, lenders were required by HMDA to dis-
close the aggregate number and dollar value of loans originated by census tract for
each of their market areas. Because these datum did not disclose characteristics of
individual borrowers, their usefulness in assessing financial institution lending pat-
terns was limited. HMDA was amended in 1989 to require financial institutions to
make available information about individual applicants by census tract, including
their income, sex, race, the loan amount requested and whether their applications
were approved or rejected.
23. See Christine Dugas, Lending Bias Is Greater Nationwide Than In NY, NEws-
DAY, Oct. 28, 1994, at A-57.
24. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTER-
PRETING HMDA DATA (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7,
Oct. 1992).
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cants.25 To date, no comparable study of lending patterns has been
completed for New York City.
The most direct method of estimating the incidence of discrimi-
nation is through the use of testers. Pairs of individuals-one mi-
nority and one majority-are sent separately to the offices of real
estate agents or landlords, posing as home or apartment seekers.
These testers are similarly matched with respect to characteristics
other than race or ethnicity so that discrimination can be inferred
from differential treatment.
In the mid-1980s, the New York City Human Rights Commission
and the Corporation Counsel jointly conducted an investigation
and prosecution of systemic discrimination in the New York City
housing market. The project, funded by a grant from the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
targeted real estate agents in each of the City's boroughs, with the
exception of Manhattan. Matched pairs of testers were sent to 32
real estate brokers and managing agents between March 1986 and
February 1988.26 Discrimination was inferred if the minority tester
was treated less favorably than the white tester at least three times.
In 18 of the 32 separate investigations, the City determined that
probable cause existed to ascertain that discrimination had oc-
curred.27 Only three agents or landlords were conclusively found
not to discriminate; the remaining investigations were suspended
because of broker suspicion, tester error or other administrative
problems.28
Although the Human Rights Commission's systemic investiga-
tion suggests that discrimination based upon race and ethnicity was
25. Id. at 34. The Boston Federal Reserve Bank study has been replicated by
members of the Housing Research staff of the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion. Their results substantially support the validity of the earlier study. See James H.
Carr & Isaac F. Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage
Lending Revisited, 4 J. HOUSING REs. 277, 311 (1993) ("Our study confirms these
results and refutes recent reports that attempted to discredit the original Boston Fed
Research."). Other commentators have been more critical of the methodology of the
Boston Fed. See, e.g., Mitchell B. Rachlis & Anthony M.J. Yezer, Serious Flaws in
Statistical Tests for Discrimination in Mortgage Markets, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 315, 326-
30 (1993) (noting the econometric problems with studies such as the Boston Fed's);
Stan Liebowitz, A Study That Deserves No Credit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1993, at A14;
Mark Zandi, Boston Fed's Bias Study Was Deeply Flawed, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19,
1993, at 13.
26. See Karen Webber, Systemic Report: Fair Housing Assistance Program Type
II, HA-14607 1 (undated and unpublished report prepared by the New York City
Commission on Human Rights in 1988) (on file with the author).
27. See id. at 43.
28. Id.
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a substantial problem in New York in the mid- to late-1980s, the
evidence cannot be utilized to infer the overall incidence of dis-
crimination in the housing market. Real estate agents were not
selected randomly by investigators; instead, one of the criteria used
to select agents for investigation was an allegation of discrimina-
tory behavior. Therefore, it is likely that the results of the investi-
gation over-estimate the level of discrimination in the New York
City housing market.
More systematic data, however, can be obtained from the Hous-
ing Discrimination Study (HDS) conducted by the Urban Institute
in 1989. The study involved 3,800 fair housing (matched tester)
audits in 25 metropolitan areas. 29 The HDS authors used
econometric techniques to obtain estimates of the likelihood that
black or Hispanic persons would encounter discrimination in hous-
ing-related transactions. Based upon a national sample, they con-
cluded that 53% of black renters and 59% of black homebuyers
could be expected to encounter one or more incidents of discrimi-
nation.3° Among Hispanics, the expected incidence of discrimina-
tion was 46% for renters and 56% for homebuyers. 3' The results of
this study therefore demonstrate the persistence of discrimination
in the housing market.
Relatively small sample sizes, however, make it difficult to draw
conclusions about rates of housing discrimination in individual cit-
ies included in the HDS. Nevertheless, the authors oversampled a
subset of cities, including New York. According to the authors, the
proportion of blacks who encountered comparatively unfavorable
treatment in the New York housing market ranged from 40% to
48%.32 Between 53% and 61% of Hispanic home-seekers in the
New York metropolitan area sample had similar experiences.33
The authors of the HDS further examined the extent to which
living in a particular metropolitan area affected the probability that
a minority household would encounter discrimination. Compared
to New York, no metropolitan area in the sample had a statistically
29. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, RAYMOND J. STRUYK & JOHN YINGER,
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS 1 (1991). The study was funded by
HUD.
30. See id. at 43.
31. Id.
32. See JOHN YINGER, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: INCIDENCE OF DIS-
CRIMINATION AND VARIATION IN DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOR 43-53 (1991). The
overall rates of unfavorable treatment are not directly comparable to the probabilities
of discrimination reported in the immediately preceding paragraph since the latter are
estimated by econometric techniques.
33. Id.
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HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
greater impact on the probability of a household encountering dis-
crimination.3 4 Furthermore, the results of the regression analyses
suggest that residents of New York had a significantly higher likeli-
hood of experiencing discrimination as compared to the residents
of several other cities.
B. Consequences of Discrimination For Minority Households
Existing research supports the proposition that substantial dis-
crimination against racial and ethnic minorities exists in the New
York City housing market. Discrimination by actors in the housing
market limits the housing opportunities available to minority
households and, in so doing, affects not only their housing condi-
tions, but their health and welfare, as well as their social mobility.
There can be no doubt that the housing conditions of black and
Hispanic residents of New York are much less advantageous than
white households. Every three years, New York City contracts
with the Census Bureau to conduct a survey of households in the
City. Data from the 1993 New York City Housing and Vacancy
Survey (NYCHVS) on the housing conditions of different racial
and ethnic groups are contained in Table 1. White New York
households have a significantly higher rate of homeownership
(39.3%) than any other racial or ethnic group including blacks
(22.2%), Puerto Ricans (12.0%), and Asians (30.8%). In terms of
housing affordability, compared to whites, a significantly greater
proportion of black, Hispanic, and Asian households pay over 35%
of their incomes for rent. Similarly, higher proportions of racial
and ethnic minorities live in crowded conditions and in buildings
with three or more housing maintenance deficiencies. In terms of
neighborhood quality, a much higher proportion of minority
households live in neighborhoods they characterize as "poor" and
on blocks with boarded up dwellings.
34. See id. at 55-59.
35. For example among black-white testers in the sales market, significantly lower
rates of discrimination were found in Austin, Chicago, Dayton, Lansing, Macon, and
Philadelphia. In the rental market, no city had a significantly lower rate of discrimi-
nation with respect to black-white pairs. Similarly, among Hispanic homebuyers, Chi-
cago, Denver, Houston, and Tuscon had lower rates of discrimination. For Hispanic
renters, lower rates of discrimination were found in Austin, Denver, Houston, Los
Angeles, Phoenix, and Tuscon. See id.
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Table 1: Housing Characteristics of New York City Households
Non-Puerto
Puerto Rican
All Races White Black Rican Hispanic Asian
Paying more 40.7% 34.7% 38.9%** 48.6%** 52.0%** 38.8%*
than 35% of
income in rent
Paying more 27.1% 22.6% 25.4%** 35.6%** 34.9%** 23.6%*
than 50% of
income in rent
Living in 23.6% 15.4% 24.9%** 29.1%** 42.1%** 43.7%**
Crowded
Housing
Living in 17.1% 12.3% 27.7%** 20.9%** 15.4%** 8.3%*
neighborhood
with boarded
up buildings
Living in 6.4% 1.8% 11.7%** 11.4%** 11.2%** 2.5%
"poor"
neighborhood
Living in 16.4% 8.2% 24.8%** 25.9%** 24.7%** 14.1%*
Buildings with
3 or more
deficiencies
Owner- 28.7% 39.5% 22.3%** 12.0%** 12.0%** 30.8%**
Occupants
Source: 1993 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey Longitudinal Microdata File
Note: Each observation in the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey sample is weighted by
household weights generated by the Census Bureau.
* Significantly different from whites at the 5% level.
** Significantly different from whites at the 1% level.
Given the income disparities between New York City's white
households and its nonwhite and ethnic minority population, 36 one
would expect differences to exist in rates of homeownership, af-
fordability and housing and neighborhood quality. Therefore, Ta-
ble 2 only includes data for households whose incomes are below
the federally prescribed poverty level. Nevertheless, among poor
households, the racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership
rates still increase. Almost one-quarter of poor white households
are owner-occupied compared to only 7.9% of blacks and 2.9% of
Puerto Ricans. A greater proportion of poor white households-
65.5%-pay more than half of their incomes for rent than any
other racial or ethnic group except non-Puerto Rican Hispanics.
Among black and Puerto Rican households, the proportions who
pay over half of their incomes for rent are 54.5% and 61.9%, re-
36. See supra text accompanying note 16.
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
spectively. On virtually all of the other housing and neighborhood
quality indicators, poor white households are in an advantageous
position compared to blacks and Hispanics. One-third of poor
black and Hispanic households live in buildings with three or more
maintenance deficiencies compared to only one in ten poor white
households. Approximately one-third of poor black and Puerto
Rican households and almost one-half of non-Puerto Rican His-
panic and Asian poor households live in crowded conditions com-
pared to only one-fifth of poor white households. Finally, roughly
one-quarter and one-third of poor Puerto Rican and black families,
respectively, live on blocks with boarded-up buildings as compared
to fewer than one in ten whites.
Table 2: Housing Characteristics of New York City Households
with Incomes Below the Poverty Level
Non-Puerto
Puerto Rican
All Races White Black Rican Hispanic Asian
Paying more 72.6% 72.8% 66.9%* 73.5% 83.6%** 71.2%
than 35% of
income in rent
Paying more 62.0% 65.5% 54.5%** 61.9%* 73.1%* 60.6%*
than 50% of
income in rent
Living in 33.1% 20.4% 34.5%** 31.9%** 48.5%** 46.9%**
crowded
housing
Living in 21.9% 9.1% 32.6%** 24.6%** 20.8%** 7.9%
neighborhood
with boarded
up buildings
Living in 13.4% 3.2% 18.5%** 16.8%** 16.3%** 4.8%
"poor"
neighborhood
Living in 27.3% 10.0% 35.3%** 32.1%** 32.6%** 21.8%*
buildings with
3 or more
deficiencies
Owner- 10.6% 24.1% 7.9%** 2.9%** 4.3%** 16.4%*
Occupants
Source: 1993 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey Longitudinal Microdata File
Note: Each observation in the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey sample is weighted by
household weights generated by the Census Bureau.
* Significantly different from whites at the 5% level.
** Significantly different from whites at the 1% level.
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the housing and neighborhood condi-
tions of racial and ethnic minorities in New York City are substan-
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tially less desirable than those of white families. Nevertheless,
despite disaggregating poor families from the non-poor, it is still
possible that factors other than race or ethnicity may be causing
these disparate conditions. For example, one hypothesis that
would be consistent with the data in Table 2 is that poor white
households pay a greater proportion of their incomes for rent and
thereby consume better housing and neighborhoods. Disentan-
gling the separate effects of race on housing and neighborhood
quality requires the use of multivariate techniques.
In her research, Emily Rosenbaum has used the NYCHVS to
analyze the impact of race and ethnicity upon the housing and
neighborhood attributes of recent movers in New York City. In
one article,37 she constructed a sample of housing units which had
experienced a change of occupancy between 1978-1981, 1981-1984
or 1984-1987. Using logistic regression techniques as controls for a
wide variety of building and household characteristics, she found
that compared to white households, blacks and Hispanics were
more likely to move to apartments with three or more housing
maintenance deficiencies 38 and to neighborhoods characterized as
fair or poor.39 A separate study using data from 1991 determined
that, compared to whites, housing disparities existed for a variety
of Hispanic sub-groups such as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and
Central Americans." Among Asians, however, no significant dif-
ferences existed with respect to the likelihood of living in an apart-
ment with three or more housing maintenance deficiencies.4
Rosenbaum further concluded that, other than the Chinese, had a
lower probability than whites of being a homeowner.
-The NYCHVS data show clear racial and ethnic disparities in
housing and neighborhood quality. Together with the HDS results
37. See Emily Rosenbaum, The Constraints on Minority Housing Choices, New
York City 1978-1987, 72 Soc. FORCES 725 (1994).
38. See id. at 739. Housing maintenance deficiencies include rodents, cracks/holes
in walls/floors, missing plaster, insufficient heat and heating breakdowns in the last 90
days. See id. at 732.
39. See id. at 739. Non-Puerto Rican Hispanic households were not significantly
more likely than white households to move to buildings with three or more housing
maintenance deficiencies. Id.
40. See Emily Rosenbaum, Racial/Ethnic Differences in Home Ownership and
Housing Quality, 1991 (Paper presented at the 1995 Meeting of the Population Asso-
ciation of America in San Francisco) (Table 2) (copy on file with the author). The
housing and neighborhood quality indicators included in this study were the existence
of three or more housing maintenance deficiencies and the existence of abandoned
buildings on the block.
41. Id. Among non-Chinese Asians, however, a greater probability of living on a
block with abandoned housing existed. Id.
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HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
and New York's relatively high dissimilarity index score, these data
suggest that race discrimination plays an important role in contrib-
uting to high levels of racial segregation in the City, as well as in-
ferior neighborhoods and housing conditions for racial and ethnic
minorities.
Regardless of its cause, high levels of racial and ethnic housing
segregation are likely to have an enormous impact on the health,
safety and welfare of city residents. Since the 1970s, cities through-
out the nation have experienced a sharp increase in the geographic
concentration of poverty. John D. Kasarda's analysis of census
data for the largest one hundred cities in America indicates that
the number of extreme poverty tracts-census tracts in which 40%
or more of the residents earn incomes below the federal poverty
level-jumped from 751 in 1970 to 1,954 in 1990.42 The population
living in these extreme poverty tracts doubled during the twenty-
year period. 3 In New York City, the number of extreme poverty
tracts increased at an even faster rate than the national average.
From 1970 to 1990, the number of extreme poverty tracts jumped
from 73 to 276; by 1990, 952,484 people or 13% of the City's popu-
lation lived in these neighborhoods."
As Massey and Denton have demonstrated, high levels of hous-
ing segregation among racial and ethnic minorities make them es-
pecially vulnerable to living in neighborhoods of concentrated
poverty. 45 Given the disproportionately higher rates of poverty ex-
perienced by blacks and Hispanics as compared to whites, segrega-
tion acts to concentrate and intensify poverty.46 This relationship is
discernible between race and residence in New York City. In 1990,
of the 952,484 people residing in extreme poverty tracts in the City,
409,271 were non-Hispanic black individuals and 459,099 were
Hispanic. 47
42. See John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Dis-
tress: 1970 to 1990, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 253, 258, 263 (1993). As a proportion
of all census tracts in the 100 cities, extreme poverty tracts increased from 6% to
13.7%. See id. at 258.
43. In 1970, 2.7 million people lived in extreme poverty tracts. This number in-
creased to 5.5 million in 1990. See id. at 263.
44. See John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Poverty and Economic Access, in REDIS-
COVERING URBAN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1980s 4-1, 4-39 to 4-41 (Jack
Sommer & Donald A. Hicks eds., 1993).
45. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 18, at 118-25. For a review of Massey and
Denton's book, see Michael H. Schill, Race, the Underclass, and Public Policy, 19 J. L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 433 (1994).
46. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 18, at 140-45.
47. See Kasarda, supra note 44, at 4-41.
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Living in communities of concentrated poverty has enormous so-
cial consequences for New York City's minority residents. Typi-
cally, these communities have high rates of infant mortality and
crime. 8 Proximate employment opportunities typically diminish as
do other forms of economic activity. 49 In addition, several sociolo-
gists have argued that living in communities of concentrated pov-
erty can generate behavioral adaptations which impede social
mobility. For example, William Julius Wilson has argued that chil-
dren who grow up in environments with few working role models
develop weak attachments to the labor force. 0 Lacking employ-
ment opportunities and the appropriate socialization to seek work,
these youths will frequently engage in deviant or illegal activities to
earn income and gain status, thereby further distancing themselves
from middle-class norms.5' These behaviors are reinforced by peer
groups. Activities likely to assist them in obtaining employment
and social mobility, such as graduating from high school, are stig-
matized rather than valued.52
Since 1987, social scientists have repeatedly tested Wilson's hy-
pothesis that growing up in a neighborhood of concentrated pov-
erty will generate "concentration effects." Although the precise
causal mechanism remains a matter of debate, studies testing the
theory demonstrate a consistent relationship between social and
spatial isolation on the one hand, and high rates of teenage
childbearing, school dropouts and welfare dependency on the
other.5 3
48. See CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK, KEEPING TRACK OF
NEW YORK'S CHILDREN 55-63 (1995).
49. For a discussion of how some impoverished neighborhoods are seeking to
spark economic development, see Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community
Development Corporations in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE - (forthcoming 1997).
50. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 56-57 (1987).
51. Id. at 57-58. See also William J. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Disloca-
tions: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 12 (1991) ("The
issue is not simply that the underclass or ghetto poor have a marginal position in the
labor market ... it is also that their economic position is uniquely reinforced by their
social milieu.").
52. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 18, at 167-76 (describing "oppositional
cultures" developed by young people to protect their self esteem).
53. See Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy, in THE UR-
BAN UNDERCLASS 375, 382-90 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991)
(describing cultural explanations for teenage pregnancy in ghetto communities);
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Devel-
opment?, 99 AM. J. Soc. 353 (1993) (the presence of affluent neighbors decreases the
likelihood that teenagers will have children and drop out of school); Rebecca L.
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II. The New York City Human Rights Commission and the
Battle Against Housing Discrimination
Although the problems posed by housing discrimination appear
especially intense today, they have existed in one form or another
for almost a century. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan ob-
served that in 1910, although blacks constituted only a small
proportion of the City's total population, segregation was "univer-
sal."54 By 1920, according to Harold Connolly, Brooklyn residents
were already banding together to prevent black families from mov-
ing into their neighborhoods.
New York City was at the forefront of efforts to combat housing
discrimination. In 1955, Mayor LaGuardia and the City Council
created the Commission on Intergroup Relations (COIR) to inves-
tigate claims of discrimination. Three years later, New York be-
came the first city in the nation to outlaw discrimination in the
private housing market. COIR and later its successor, the New
York City Human Rights Commission, were vested with the au-
thority to administer and enforce this law. This part discusses,
from an historical perspective, New York City's pathbreaking Fair
Housing Practices Law and the efforts by COIR and the Human
Rights Commission to fight discrimination in the housing market.
It then examines the law more carefully, drawing parallels to simi-
lar state and federal statutes. Finally, it examines current enforce-
ment of the law by the Human Rights Commission.
Clark, NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECrS ON DROPPING OUT OF SCHOOL AMONG TEENAGE
Boys 16-21 (Urban Institute Discussion Paper PSC-DSC-UI-13, Dec. 1992) (rates of
school drop-outs among boys increase as the proportion of poor households in a com-
munity increases and as the proportion of households employed in middle-class occu-
pations declines, although the results do not support a contagion theory); Jonathan
Crane, The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out
and Teenage Childbearing, 96 AM. J. Soc. 1226, 1236 (1991) (as the proportion of high
status job-holders in a community declines, teenage pregnancy and the rate of school
drop-outs increases exponentially, thereby supporting the contagion model); Paul
Osterman, Welfare Participation in a Full Employment Economy: The Impact of
Neighborhood, 38 SoC. PROB. 475, 486 (1991) (as the proportion of employed persons
in a community decreases, the likelihood that an individual resident will receive pub-
lic assistance increases.).
54. See GLAZER & MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 26.
55. See HAROLD X. CONNOLLY, A GHErTO GROWS IN BROOKLYN 58-60 (1977)
(describing the Gates Avenue Association in Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant
neighborhood).
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A. The New York City Human Rights Commission's Battle
Against Housing Discrimination: An Historical
Perspective
1. The Early Years (1939-1965)
Legislative efforts to combat housing discrimination in New
York City began, in earnest, during and after World War 11.56 In
1939, the State of New York banned discrimination in publicly
owned housing based upon a tenant's "race, creed, color or na-
tional origin."' 57 In 1943, partly in response to the restrictive rental
practices of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in its newly
constructed Stuyvesant Town development,58 the City Council fur-
ther outlawed discrimination in any housing which benefited from
tax exemptions. 59
Responding to the Harlem Race Riots, Mayor LaGuardia estab-
lished an interracial Unity Committee in 1943. The Committee,
supported largely by private donations, was charged with investi-
gating and conciliating claims of racial discrimination. One of the
main achievements of the Committee was a statement approved by
the Mayor in 1950 decrying racial discrimination as being a "moral
travesty," violating democratic and Christian traditions.6° The
Unity Committee was superceded in 1955 by the Commission on
Intergroup Relations (COIR).6' COIR, whose fifteen members
were appointed by the Mayor, was charged with investigating com-
plaints and initiating its own investigations of discrimination based
upon race, creed, color, national origin and ancestry. Unlike the
Unity Committee, COIR was empowered to issue subpoenas and
take testimony under oath.6'
Meanwhile, the State of New York and New York City were
gearing up to expand the scope of existing anti-discrimination laws.
By 1951, both the City Council and the New York State Legislature
56. Some have argued that New York's legislation to combat housing discrimina-
tion was a response to the racial and ethnic genocide practiced by Nazi Germany. See
Robison, supra note 2, at 34-35,
57. Id. at 35.
58. A legal challenge was mounted to Metropolitan Life's exclusionary admissions
practice in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). In the end, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
development did not involve state action and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
59. See Robison, supra note 2, at 36.
60. See GERALD BENJAMIN, RACE RELATIONS AND THE NEW YORK CITY COM-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 67-68 (1974).
61. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 55 (June 3, 1955).
62. Id. at § B1-5.0(4)-(5).
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had passed laws outlawing discrimination in housing which re-
ceived substantial public assistance.63 In 1955, the Governor also
signed legislation extending anti-discrimination coverage to hous-
ing built with federal mortgage insurance. 61
In 1957, two years after it had established COIR, the New York
City Council passed the first law in the nation prohibiting discrimi-
nation in privately-owned housing that did not receive public subsi-
dies or tax abatements. Following defeat of a similar measure in
the New York State Legislature, Councilmembers Sharkey, Brown
and Isaacs introduced a bill which provided for criminal penalties
against people who were found to discriminate. The legislation at-
tracted the intense opposition of the real estate industry.65 In an
effort to achieve a consensus behind the bill, the criminal penalty
provisions were dropped and, in their place, the sponsors substi-
tuted enforcement by civil suits as well as administrative enforce-
ment by COIR.66 Before finally passing the City Council on
December 5, 1957, the enforcement provisions were weakened
once more when they were amended to provide that only COIR
would have the authority to seek conciliation. If this were not pos-
sible, the complaint would be forwarded to the newly created Fair
Housing Practices Board for investigation. If the Fair Housing
Practices Board made a determination that proscribed discrimina-
tion had likely taken place, the complaint would be sent to the Cor-
poration Counsel for legal action.67 Four years later, the New York
State Legislature passed a similar law.68 Despite challenges, New
York courts held that the new state anti-discrimination law did not
preempt New York City's Fair Housing Practices law.69
In 1960, the constitutionality of New York City's Fair Housing
Practices Law was challenged in state court. In Martin v. City of
New York,7° the plaintiff was a landlord who claimed that the local
63. See Robison, supra note 2, at 46-49.
64. See id. at 52.
65. See id. at 54.
66. See id. at 55.
67. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 80 (Dec. 30, 1957).
68. See Robison, supra note 2, at 62. The state legislation had broader coverage
than the law passed by the New York City Council in 1957. Instead of being limited
to multi-family dwellings, the state statute applied to all housing except rentals in two
family owner-occupied homes and rooms to boarders. See id. New York City would
broaden its coverage to mirror the state statute the same year. See infra text accom-
panying note 80.
69. See City of New York v. Claflington, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 547, 243 N.Y.S.2d 437
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
70. 22 Misc. 2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1960).
1996] 1007
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
law interfered with his property rights. According to the com-
plaint, the landlord alleged that the existence of black tenants
would reduce his rental income. Observing that the state had
broad powers to regulate the housing market, the court rejected
the constitutional challenge and upheld the law.7
With its new responsibilities, COIR grew faster between 1958
and 1960 than during any other point in its history or the history of
its successors. In 1956-1957, prior to the passage of the Fair Hous-
ing Practices Act, COIR employed 12 people and had a budget of
$120,000. Three years later, its budget had jumped to $370,525 and
its staff to 53.72 Importantly, the Fair Housing Practices Law also
changed the orientation of COIR. In 1956, prior to its enactment,
the Commission launched the Open Cities Program, an attempt to
promote desegregation by systematic action. Under the program,
COIR promoted the development of centralized listings of housing
vacancies and negotiated with apartment building owners to make
units available to racial and ethnic minority households.73 The
Sharlley-Brown-Isaacs Act effectively redirected the attention of
the Commission away from systemic efforts to fight segregation
and towards the processing of individual complaints.74
In the four years immediately following the adoption of the Fair
Housing Practices Law, COIR received 939 sworn complaints al-
leging housing discrimination.75 Just over half of these complaints
were settled by COIR; the remainder were dismissed for adminis-
trative reasons or because discrimination was unsubstantiated. Of
those cases settled by COIR, the complainant was offered the
apartment at issue 29.1% of the time and an alternative dwelling in
an additional 24% of the cases. 7 6 Eighty-one percent of all com-
plainants were black and 8% were Puerto Rican.77 A majority of
these people were characterized by members of the Commission's
research staff as middle class.78
71. Id. at 391, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13.
72. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 86.
73. See id. at 101.
74. Id. at 103.
75. See Florence M. Cromien, Four Years of the Fair Housing Practices Law of the
City of New York: Status of Complaints of Discrimination in Housing April 1, 1958 -
March 31, 1962 (NYCCHR Research Report No. 11, June 1962) (on file with the
author).
76. Id. at 3.
77. See Goldblatt and Cromien, supra note 2, at 366-67.
78. Id. Thirty-seven percent of the black complainants were college graduates and
an additional 22% had some college education. Id.
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Over the next several years, the City Council made several
changes affecting enforcement of the City's laws prohibiting hous-
ing discrimination. In 1961, the Fair Housing Practices Law was
amended to make discriminatory lending practices and advertising
illegal.7 9 In addition, the exemptions under the original law were
narrowed. Only two-family dwellings, in which the owner occupied
one housing unit, and rooms in apartments or homes were ex-
empted from coverage. 0
In 1962, COIR was re-constituted as the New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights, although its powers did not substan-
tially change. Local Law 97, passed by the City Council in 1965,
however, gave the Commission additional broad enforcement pow-
ers with respect to claims of housing discrimination . 1 The Com-
mission, rather than the Fair Housing Practices Board, investigated
discrimination claims and had the power to issue subpoenas, take
proof and administer oaths. The Commission also had the power
to post notices on buildings under investigation warning prospec-
tive tenants or purchasers that occupancy of the dwellings was con-
stested. In addition, the Human Rights Commission was
authorized to obtain temporary injunctive relief to preserve hous-
ing opportunities for complaints. Finally, after hearing evidence,
the Commission was empowered to issue cease and desist orders
and require the respondent to take affirmative measures to remedy
discriminatory actions.82
One section of Local Law 97 that had nothing to do with housing
nonetheless had a profound affect on the New York City Human
Rights Commission and its efforts to fight residential discrimina-
tion. For virtually all of its young life, the battle against housing
discrimination and segregation was the central activity of COIR.83
Nevertheless, in 1965 the Human Rights Commission's jurisdiction
expanded to include claims involving employment discrimination.84
Within a short period of time, employment discrimination claims
outnumbered those concerning housing.85
79. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 48 § X41-3.0(b)-(c) (1961).
80. Id. at § 41-3.0(a).
81. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 97 (Dec. 13, 1965).
82. Id. Unsuccessful complainants or respondents could appeal the findings of the
Human Rights Commission to state supreme court. Nevertheless, the Commission's
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id.
83. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 101.
84. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 97, § B1-7.0.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41.
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2. Expansion and Change. 1966-1989
In 1968, the City Council began gradually expanding the classes
of people protected under the New York City Human Rights Law.
Passage of Local Law 95 provided protections for people with
physical handicaps.86 Five years later, the Council passed and the
Mayor signed Local Law 7, which forbade discrimination on the
basis of sex or marital status.87 In a hearing preceding the signing
of the ordinance, the Mayor and members of the Council noted
that some building owners would not rent to single people, particu-
larly single women. One speaker observed that landlords some-
times used sex or marital status as a pretext for rejecting
prospective minority tenants.88
In 1977, discrimination against tenants or homebuyers on the ba-
sis of age was outlawed in New York89 and, in 1981, the Council
passed a bill broadening the definition of handicap to include
mental impairments.90 Alcoholics, substance abusers and drug ad-
dicts were protected from discrimination provided they were re-
covering and, at the time of the application for housing, free from
abuse. 91
Further enlargement of the scope of the Human Rights Law oc-
curred in 1986. Observing that "throughout the history of the city,
many New Yorkers have encountered prejudice on account of their
sexual orientation, 9 2 the City Council passed Local Law 2 outlaw-
ing discrimination based on sexual orientation.9 3 That same year
the Council proscribed discrimination based upon a person's lawful
occupation.94 Finally, families with children were brought within
the scope of the Human Rights Law. In signing the applicable leg-
islation, the Mayor observed: "Because housing is in such short
supply, rental restrictions placed on families add an untenable
burden to low-, moderate-, and middle- income people .... 5)95 The
Mayor pointed to testimony given at a 1983 hearing demonstrating
86. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 95 (1968).
87. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 7 (Feb. 7, 1973). The law exempts from
coverage single sex rooming houses, dormitories and residential hotels. Id.
88. Public Hearing on Local Laws, June 25, 1973 (statement of Mayor Edward I.
Koch) (transcript on file with the author).
89. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 61 (Sept. 6, 1977).
90. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 49 (June 16, 1981).
91. Id. at §§ 2-3.
92. New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 2 § 1 (Apr. 2, 1986).
93. Id. at § 2.
94. New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 59 § 1 (Nov. 25, 1986).
95. Public Hearing on Local Laws, June 25, 1973 (statement of Mayor Edward I.
Koch) (transcript on file with the author).
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that restrictions against children in rental buildings were common
and "profoundly" affected minority and female-headed
households.96
The last major expansion of the groups protected under the
Human Rights Law took place in 1989. In that year, the City
Council passed a law making it illegal to discriminate against a per-
son based upon his or her alienage or citizenship status.97 Accord-
ing to the statement of policy contained in the legislation, the
passage of federal immigration laws designed to restrict illegal
aliens had made immigrants to the City vulnerable to exploitation.
Discrimination was practiced not just with respect to illegal immi-
grants, but also against people perceived to be there in violation of
the law.98 Sometimes citizenship status was used as a pretext for
already proscribed discrimination based upon national origin.99
In addition to responding to individual complaints, during the
period between 1966 and 1989, the Commission sporadically en-
gaged in proactive efforts to investigate discrimination in the hous-
ing market and promote integration. In 1968, for example, the
Commission began an investigation of Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company's "deliberate, intentional and systematic" exclusion of
blacks and Puerto Ricans from the Stuyvesant Town, Peter Cooper
Village and Parkchester housing developments. Following public-
ity of the investigation, Metropolitan Life entered into an agree-
ment with the Commission in which it promised to stop its practice
of giving preferences to relatives of existing tenants, consider
blacks and Puerto Ricans concurrently with people already on
waiting lists for the developments, and issue orders to its staff not
to discriminate.100 Within five months from the date the agreement
was reached, just under one-fifth of all new tenants selected for
Parkchester and Stuyvesant Town were nonwhite. 101
Integration in the 1960s and 1970s was threatened not solely by
the refusal of landlords, sellers and real estate agents to deal with
nonwhite homebuyers and tenants; in addition, neighborhoods
throughout the City were rapidly transforming from white to black
through a combination of blockbusting and white flight. Hearings
96. Id.
97. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 52 § 3 (July 18, 1989).
98. Id. at § 1.
99. Memorandum on "Protecting Immigrants from Discrimination" from Dr. John
E. Brandon, Commissioner, to Mayor Edward I. Koch 3 (October 26, 1988) (on file
with the author).
100. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 234.
101. Id.
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revealed that in several neighborhoods real estate agents spread
rumors that black people would soon be moving into the communi-
ties and that property values would plummet. The fear of falling
property values and racial prejudice caused white owners to move
away, selling their homes for less than market value. Entire neigh-
borhoods were transformed from white to black in a matter of
years. 102
Under the leadership of its chairperson, Eleanor Holmes Nor-
ton, the New York City Human Rights Commission launched an
ambitious program to shore up neighborhoods and promote inte-
gration. The central element of this policy was the federally-
funded Neighborhood Stabilization Program, which sought to pre-
vent neighborhood transition by enforcing the law against
blockbusting and organizing residents to preserve their neighbor-
hoods.10 3 Outreach offices were opened in several neighborhoods.
Clean-up campaigns, street repairs and community meetings were
also part of this multi-pronged effort."° In addition, the Commis-
sion promoted efforts to affirmatively market neighborhoods so as
to attract and retain a diverse population. 0 5
The Commission also sought to prevent blockbusting and redlin-
ing of New York City neighborhoods. Using its power to issue
"non-solicitation orders,' 0 6 the Commission forbade real estate
agents from soliciting clients in several neighborhoods in Queens
and the Bronx.'07 In addition, the Commission was instrumental in
getting the Secretary of State to issue non-solicitation orders for
the entire boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens. 10 8 Efforts were also
made to uncover practices of financial institutions that effectively
102. Id. at 165-66.
103. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, The Challenge of Equality: The Work of the New
York City Commission on Human Rights 1970-1977 52-53 (May 1977) (unpublished
report on file with the author).
104. Id. at 52-54.
105. Id. at 52.
106. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-204 (1996).
107. See Holmes Norton, supra note 103, at 62-63..
108. Id. at 64. In 1989, the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that the Secre-
tary of State exceeded her authority in ordering non-solicitation orders. See Campa-
gna v. Shaffer, 73 N.Y.2d 237, 243, 536 N.E.2d 368, 370-71, 538 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935-36.
The New York State Legislature responded to Campagna by granting the Secretary
broad powers to enter nonsolicitation orders. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-h
(McKinney 1994). This legislation was struck down by a federal appellate court in
1994 as violating the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See New
York State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 511 (1994).
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denied credit to inner city communities.109 Studies of purported
"redlining" were undertaken for several neighborhoods including
those in Southeast Queens and Rockaway." 0
As described in more detail in Part I, in the mid-1980s, the
Human Rights Commission also launched a systemic investigation
of discrimination by real estate agents in four New York bor-
oughs."' A total of 32 investigations were conducted and 12 com-
plaints were filed in federal court by the Corporation Counsel. The
Commission obtained settlements in every case. Typically, the con-
sent decree required the defendant to agree to not discriminate
against protected groups, to require its brokers and salespeople to
attend training sessions on anti-discrimination law, and to 'ade-
quately supervise employees to ensure that no discrimination oc-
curred in the future. Defendants also paid civil fines to the City,
promised to advertise in newspapers with predominantly minority
readership and agreed to maintain adequate records for inspection
of housing opportunities and people served." 2
3. The Human Rights Commission in the 1990s
The 1990s have, thus far, been a turbulent period for the New
York City Human Rights Commission. The decade began with a
major reorganization of the Commission in response to a report
prepared by a mayoral task force. The task force made sixty-two
separate recommendations, several of which were implemented ad-
ministratively." 3 Perhaps most important with respect to housing,
the Fair Housing Division was subsumed under a newly constituted
Law Enforcement Division. 1 4 Therefore, beginning in the early
1990s, housing discrimination complaints would be investigated by
the same staff that handled cases involving AIDS, government em-
ployment and private employment.
The City Council implemented several other Task Force recom-
mendations and added several of its own ideas in its 1991 compre-
109. See Holmes Norton, supra note 103, at 65.
110. See, e.g., New York City Commission on Human Rights, Redlining in Southeast
Queens (December 1977) (unpublished report on file with the author); New York City
Commission on Human Rights, Redlining in Rockaway (June 1978) (unpublished re-
port on file with the author).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
112. See, e.g., City of New York v. Fillmore Real Estate, Ltd., 85 Civ. 1769 (ERK)
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1989) (consent judgment).
113. TASK FORCE ON THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
TASK FORCE REPORT 107 (1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
114. Id. at 17-18.
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hensive overhaul of the Human Rights Law. 115 Local Law 39
narrowed the exemption for single family homes to include only
homes that were sold or rented without public advertisement.
1 6
The ordinance also allowed owners of housing built for senior citi-
zens to discriminate against families with children."17 Furthermore,
the law explicitly prohibited the practice of blockbusting. 1
8
In addition to expanding coverage, Local Law 39 made several
changes to the Human Rights Commission's enforcement mecha-
nisms. The ordinance spelled out in detail the powers and proce-
dures of the Commission both regarding the investigation of
individual complaints and systemic discriminatory practices. With
respect to the latter, the City Council expressly authorized the use
of a disparate impact theory of liability." 9 Civil penalties of up to
$50,000 were authorized for violation of the law.
In light of the persistent backlog of complaints facing the Com-
mission, Local Law 39 additionally provided for a private right of
action in state court for violation of the Human Rights Act. Suc-
cessful complainants would be entitled to an award of attorneys
fees. Because other provisions of the Human Rights Law prohib-
ited litigation while the Commission had jurisdiction over a com-
plaint, the ordinance also empowered persons who had filed a
complaint with the Commission which had not been resolved in
180 days to gain a dismissal of the claim without prejudice.
B. A Comparison of Ntw York City's Human Rights Law with
State and Federal Laws Prohibiting Housing
Discrimination
New York City's Fair Housing Practices Law, later known as the
Human Rights Law, preceded similar state and federal enactments
115. See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 39 (June 18, 1991).
116. Id. at § 8-107(5)(a)(4)(a)(1). In addition, the ordinance deleted the exemption
permitting discrimination by sex in single sex rooming houses. Id. at § 8-
107(5)(a)(4)(a)(3).
117. For a more detailed description of this exemption, see infra note 132.
118. New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 39 § 8-107(a)(4)(a)(3)(c)(3). In addition, dis-
crimination based upon the perceived characteristics of prospective tenants and
homebuyers was made illegal. Local Law 39 also made several changes to the termi-
nology used to describe protected classes. References to "handicapped" were re-
placed with the word "disabled;" the term "sex" was changed to "gender." Id.
119. Under this disparate impact test, an unlawful discriminatory practice is estab-
lished when it is proved that a practice or policy of a defendant results in a disparate
impact on a protected group and the defendant fails to prove that such policy or
practice bears a significant relationship to a significant business objective. See NEW
YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)(a)(2) (1996).
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by several years. Since the 1960s, with the enactment by the New
York State Legislature of its own Human Rights Law 2 ' in 1961
and the Fair Housing Act 12 1 by Congress in 1968, New York City
residents who encounter discrimination in the housing market have
been able to seek redress under more than one body of law.
122
All three anti-discrimination laws are similarly structured. Each
law designates a set of protected classes. Acts which discriminate
against persons in these classes, such as refusing to rent or sell,
refusing to make loans or advertising in a manner that shows a
preference not to deal with these individuals, are illegal. Each stat-
ute also establishes an administrative mechanism to investigate al-
leged acts of discrimination and, if illegal discrimination is found to
occur, provides remedies to the aggrieved party or parties.
Although there is considerable overlap among the three statutes,
each differs from the other in terms of both its substantive cover-
age and enforcement procedures. Perhaps the most important dif-
ference among the three laws is the designation of protected
classes. As Table 3 indicates, all three sources of law protect
against discrimination based upon the race, religion (creed), color,
national origin, sex, disabilities or familial status of a homebuyer or
renter. 23 Each law defines disabilities as including both mental
and physical disabilities. 124 Familial status is defined under the Fair
Housing Act and the New York State Human Rights Law as in-
cluding parents with children, persons having legal custody, or pa-
rental designees who have custody of children under the age of
18.125 The New York City Human Rights Law, however, does not
explicitly define the term "children."
120. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
122. In addition, other sources of law exist for claims of housing discrimination.
See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1994); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 18-c (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-37 (Mc-
Kinney 1989); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-331 (McKinney 1989).
123. New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 80 (Dec. 30, 1957); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-
301; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 8-102(16)(a).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k)(2); N.Y.. EXEC. LAW § 292(26).
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Table 3: A Comparison of Three Laws Prohibiting Housing
Discrimination
New York City New York State United States
Human Rights Law Executive Law Fair Housing Act
Year Enacted 1958 1961 1968
Protected Groups
Exempt Housing
(Generally
Applicable)
Exempt Housing
(Applicable to
Protections for
Family Status only)
Private Right of
Action
Enforcement Agency
Public Representation
in Court
Punitive Damages in
Administrative
Action
Punitive Damages in
Court Proceeding
Civil Penalties
race
creed
color
nat'l origin
gender
age
disability
marital status
children
alienage/citizenship
sexual oriention
occupation
1-2 Family Owner
Occupied Housing*
Housing units in
which alleged
discriminating
party resides
Subsidized elderly
housing
Certain other
elderly housing
Yes
N.Y.C.
Commission on
Human Rights
No
None
Yes
Up to $50,000
race
creed
color
nat'l origin
sex
age
disability
marital status
family status
1-2 Family
Owner
Occupied
Housing**
Housing units in
which alleged
discriminating
party resides
None****
Yes
N.Y.S. Division
of Human
Rights
No
Up to $10,000
Yes
Restitution of
Profits
race
religion
color
nat'l origin
sex
handicap
family status
4 or Fewer Units in
Building &
Occupied by Owner
Single Family
Homes***
Subsidized elderly
housing
Certain other elderly
housing
Yes
U.S. Dep't of HUD
or substantially
equivalent state
agencies
Yes (by Justice
Department)
None
Yes
Up to $50,000
* Provided that the housing unit has not been publicly advertised. Exemption not applicable to
housing financed with government guaranteed loans.
** Exemption not applicable to housing financed with government guaranteed loans.
Subject to extensive limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1).
* Law exempts housing exclusively for people aged 55 and over from protections based upon age.
New York State's Human Rights Law also prohibits discrimina-
tion in housing based upon the home seeker's marital status or
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age. 12 6 In addition to including protections against discrimination
for these two classes, the New York City ordinance includes pro-
tections that go beyond the other two statutes: protecting people
against discrimination based upon their alienage or citizenship sta-
tus, sexual orientation and lawful occupation. 127
Not all housing is covered by each law. The scope of the Fair
Housing Act is the narrowest; it exempts all buildings with fewer
than five housing units provided that the owner lives in the build-
ing. 128 In addition, single family homes sold or rented by the owner
are typically not covered under the Act. 129 Like the Fair Housing
Act, both the New York State and City Human Rights Laws pro-
vide exemptions for owner-occupied housing, but limit the exempt
buildings to one and two family homes. 30 In addition, the laws
permit a person who wishes to rent a room in his or her dwelling
unit to discriminate against otherwise protected parties.13 '
The Fair Housing Act and the New York City Human Rights
Law provide additional exemptions permitting owners of housing
built for the elderly to refuse to rent or sell to families with chil-
dren. 32 The New York State Human Rights Act does not include
an exemption for elderly housing, but does provide that sellers,
landlords and agents can discriminate based upon age if the hous-
ing is exclusively limited to persons 55 years of age or older. 33
126. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 291(2).
127. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(2).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2).
129. In order for the single family home to be exempt from coverage, its owner
must own no more than two other homes. If the owner does not reside in the home at
the time of sale or was not the last resident prior to sale then the exemption applies
only to one sale within any 24 month period. In addition, the owner may not use any
sales or rental facilities or the services of a real estate agent in connection with the
sale or rental. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1).
130. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(5)(a)(3); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-
107(5)(a)(4).
131. Id.
132. Owners of housing built for the elderly and financed with public subsidies may
discriminate against families with children. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1); NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(h). In addition, owners of housing developments that
are intended for and solely occupied by persons aged 62 or older may restrict occu-
pancy to the elderly. Finally, housing that is intended and operated for occupancy by
people over the age of 54 and has significant facilities and services to meet the needs
of people in this age group is also exempt from the prohibition on discrimination
against families with children. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i). At least 80% of the
housing units must be occupied by persons 55 years of age or older. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(2)(C)(ii).
133. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)(3).
1996] 1017
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
The enforcement mechanism set up under the New York City
Human Rights Law is similar to the New York State scheme, but
quite different from the Fair Housing Act. Under the Fair Housing
Act, HUD is designated the primary administrative enforcement
agency for complaints alleging housing discrimination. If the com-
plaint originates from a state or locality with a substantially
equivalent anti-discrimination law and enforcement mechanism,
HUD must refer the complaint to the state or local human rights
agency.134 Otherwise HUD investigates the complaint and deter-
mines whether probable cause exists to believe that the law has
been violated. Whereas a probable cause finding by the New York
City Human Rights Commission automatically leads to an adminis-
trative hearing by the Commission's administrative law judge, a
similar finding by HUD presents the complainant with a choice of
forums. The complaint may be argued before a HUD administra-
tive law judge. Alternatively, either the complainant or the re-
spondent may elect to proceed in federal district court. If an
election to proceed in court is made, the United States Justice De-
partment is required to represent the complainant at no cost.
The forum in which a housing discrimination complaint is heard
affects the types of remedies that might be awarded if the seller,
landlord, real estate agent or financial institution is found to have
violated the law. Neither the Human Rights Commission nor
HUD are empowered to award punitive damages. The New York
State Division of Human Rights, however, may grant a prevailing
complainant up to $10,000 in punitive damages. 3 5 Nevertheless, if
the complainant brings a private cause of action under any of the
three laws or elects to bypass the HUD administrative law judge, a
state or federal court is empowered to grant full punitive dam-
ages. 136 Although the Human Rights Commission and HUD are
not permitted to award punitive damages to successful complain-
ants, they may order respondents to pay civil penalties to the gov-
ernment of up to $50,000.137
134. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(0(1).
135. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(4)(c).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 297(9).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-124.
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C. An Examination of Housing Discrimination Complaints
Filed with the New York City Commission on Human
Rights
In 1993, the very existence of the Human Rights Commission
was in doubt. As a mayoral candidate, Rudolph Giuliani proposed
eliminating the Commission and turning over its powers to the
state or other city agencies. 138 Upon taking office in 1994, how-
ever, Mayor Giuliani decided to retain the Commission, reorient-
ing its mission toward more efficient law enforcement.
Nevertheless, fiscal pressures to cut the City's budget have taken
their toll on the Commission. As Table 4 indicates, after steadily
growing throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Commission's ex-
penditures fell by one-fifth between 1994 and 1995. In addition,
the number of full time employees working for the Commission
declined by twenty-three percent from 1990 to 1995. Part of this
decline in budget and personnel is attributable to the effects of the
Mayor's offer of severance packages to city employees. According
to one account, one-third of the Commission's legal staff took ad-
vantage of the offer and left the agency. 139
Table 4: Budget and Personnel (1980-1994)
1980 1985 1990 1994
Commission Full Tune Personnel 110 133 205 159
Commission Expenditures (000) 2.1 2.8 8.1 9.5
Total City Expenditures & Debt Service 13,493 18,796 25,932 31,348
Commission Expenditures as a Percentage .02 .01 .03 .03
of Total City Expenditures & Debt Service
Source: CITY OF NEW YORK, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1994 (1994).
Budgetary cutbacks have made it difficult for the Human Rights
Commission to reduce its backlog of complaints and expedite the
processing of claims. Data obtained from the Commission on 266
housing complaints filed in 1992 and 1993 indicate that obtaining a
final resolution of a housing discrimination claim can take years.
As of September 1995, 227 of these complaints were either closed
by the Commission or under investigation for more than two years.
Of these 227 complaints, 22.5% closed in less than six months. An
138. Michael Powell, Rights Commission Set To Attack Rudy?, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23,
1994, at 18.
139. See Michael Powell, Party Pooped Career; Resigns Over GOP Query, NEws-
DAY, Aug. 11, 1994, at 4.
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additional 19.4% closed after six months but within one year.
However, it took between one and two years for the Commission
to close 18.1% of all housing complaints and for over 40% of the
complaints filed, a final resolution took more than two years.
Statistics on complaints filed also demonstrate the declining role
of housing discrimination in the Commission's total workload. In
1968, just over half of all complaints filed with the Human Rights
Commission pertained to housing.140 By contrast, in 1994, only 169
of the 1,355 cases in which complaints were filed or 12.5% of the
total caseload were housing-related.' 41 The decline in housing rela-
tive to other categories of discrimination claims is likely caused by
several factors. Since the mid-1960s, the Commission has increas-
ingly focused its efforts on fighting discriminatory employment
practices. 142 In addition, under the Fair Housing Act,143 all com-
plaints filed with HUD must be referred to state and local human
rights agencies as long as the agencies operate under laws that are
substantially equivalent to the Fair Housing Act. 44 Prior to 1988,
the Commission was the forum for most complaints alleging viola-
tions of federal law. However, in 1988, Congress amended the Fair
Housing Act to increase its coverage and institute a new enforce-
ment regime. Although the City Council took several steps to con-
form the City's law to the federal statute, differing enforcement
mechanisms caused the City to lose its substantial equivalence cer-
tification. 45 Thus, many claims that in earlier years would have
been investigated by the City Human Relations Commission are
now handled by HUD.
In addition to changing its emphasis from housing to employ-
ment cases, the Human Rights Commission has seen a gradual shift
in the nature of its housing caseload. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, virtually all complainants who filed housing claims with the
Commission alleged having been discriminated against because of
their race or national origin. This pattern shifted substantially as
the scope of the Human Rights Law broadened. As Table 5 indi-
cates, from January 1992 through December 1993, of the 266 com-
plaints filed with the Commission alleging discrimination in
140. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 231.
141. Interview with Randolph Wills, Managing Attorney, Law Enforcement Divi-
sion, New York City Human Rights Commission (July 25, 1995).
142. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 190-91.
143. See discussion of the Fair Housing Act, supra text accompanying note 134.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
145. For a discussion of the reasons for this lack of substantial equivalence, see
infra text accompanying note 163.
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housing, just over one-third included allegations of race discrimina-
tion; an additional one-fifth stated a claim based upon national ori-
gin.146 Among the types of discrimination outlawed after the Fair
Housing Practices Act became law, discrimination based upon dis-
ability and sexual orientation constitute the two largest categories.
More than one-fifth of all complaints filed in 1992-1993 alleged dis-
crimination on the basis of disability; 10.9% alleged denial of hous-
ing because of sexual orientation.
Table 5: Bases of Complaints Alleging Housing Discrimination
Filed With the New York City Human Rights
Commission (1992-1993)
Basis of Complaint
Race or Color
National Origin
Disability
Religion or Creed
Family With Children
Marital Status
Sex or Gender
Age or Retirement
Sexual Orientation
AIDS
Occupation
Other
Proportion of Total Complaints Filed
Alleging Basis
33.5%
(89)
18.1%
(48)
20.3%
(54)
1.5%
(4)
3.8%
(10)
6.0%
(16)
10.5%
(28)
6.4%
(17)
10.9%
(29)
3.4%
(9)
0.8%
(2)
5.3%
(14)
Source: New York City Human Rights Commission
Note: Column percentages do not sum to one hundred percent because some complaints allege more
than one basis of discrimination.
146. Twelve complaints asserted both racial discrimination and discrimination
based upon national origin. When this overlap among categories is taken into ac-
count, 125 of the 266 cases, or 46.9% of the total number of housing complaints filed
in 1992-1993, alleged one of these two forms of discrimination.
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Of the housing discrimination complaints filed with the Commis-
sion in 1992-1993, less than one-third were resolved on the merits
by September 1995. As Table 6 shows, with respect to 11.3% of
these complaints, the Commission found for the complainant; in
23.5% of the cases it found no probable cause to believe that dis-
crimination had occurred. Just over seven percent of the 1992-1993
complaints were settled, 18.3% were administratively closed and
39.4% were still under investigation.147
Table 6: Status of Cases Filed With the New York City Human
Rights Commission Alleging Housing Discrimination
(1992-1993)
Status Proportion of Cases
Probable Cause 11.3%
(30)
No Probable Cause 23.5%
(63)
Settlement 7.5%
(20)
Administrative Closure 18.3%
(48)
Still Under Investigation 39.4%
(104)
Source: New York City Human Rights Commission
Note: Status of cases is as of October 1, 1995.
HI. The New York City Human Rights Commission and
Housing Discrimination: Facing the Future
Throughout its forty year history, the New York City Human
Rights Commission has been a lightning rod for criticism. For ex-
ample, an article appearing in the November 19, 1961 issue of the
New York Times complained about the time it took the Commis-
sion (three to four months) to process housing discrimination com-
plaints.'48 A 1974 book by Gerald Benjamin concluded that the
Commission should be abolished. 149 The 1988 mayoral task force
report on the Commission criticized the Commission's "enormous
147. Administrative closures occur for a wide variety of reasons. For example, the
complainant may request that the case be closed after 180 days, may not be willing or
able to cooperate with the Commission or may not accept a reasonable settlement
offer. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-112 to 8-113.
148. Thomas W. Ennis, Firmer Bias Law in Housing Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1961, § 8, at 1.
149. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 259.
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backlog" and "systemic inefficiency.' 150 More recently, a leading
figure in New York's civil liberties community complained that the
Commission was "invisible.''5
Complaints about the functioning of the Human Rights Commis-
sion are not unique to New York City. Most states and scores of
municipalities have created human rights commissions to investi-
gate and resolve housing and employment discrimination com-
plaints.152 A 1986 survey of several of these agencies by the
American Jewish Congress criticized their lack of funding, long de-
lays in resolution of complaints, and structural inefficiencies.15 3
More recently, newspaper accounts have documented lengthy
backlogs in complaint processing and insufficient budgetary re-
sources for scores of human rights agencies including those in Kan-
sas, 154 Utah,15 5 Illinois, 56 Rhode Island 57 and Long Island.15 8
Much of the criticism of the New York City Human Rights Com-
mission revolves around the time it takes to resolve individual
complaints. On average, it took the Commission seventeen months
to close housing discrimination cases filed in 1992 and 1993. Partic-
ularly with respect to housing, justice delayed may very well be
justice denied. A person who brings a housing discrimination com-
plaint to the Commission usually needs a place to live. Given the
high transaction costs inherent in moving, when a remedy is not
provided within weeks, it is likely that the complainant will no
longer be interested in injunctive relief several months or, in some
150. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 113, at iv, 3.
151. See Powell, supra note 139, at 4 (quoting Norman Siegal, President of the New
York Civil Liberties Union).
152. For a description of state and local human rights agencies, see NATIONAL
NEIGHBORS, FAIR HOUSING RESOURCE DIRECTORY (1994).
153. See RONALD A. KRAUSS, STATE CIVIL RIGHTS AGENCIES: THE UNFILLED
PROMISE 26-38 (1986).
154. See, e.g., Brian Kaberline, Bill Would Cut Human Rights Agency's Budget,
Kan. City Bus. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at 1 (describing backlog of cases estimated to top
2,700 in 1995 and delays of 24 months before investigations begin).
155. See, e.g., Judy Fahys, Criticism Haunts 2 Utah Agencies, SALT LAKE TRIB., May
7, 1995, at E-1 (describing criticisms that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division
"takes too long").
156. See, e.g., David Heckelman, Speedier Rights Process Seen Boosting Backlog,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 22, 1995, at 1 (stating that it takes 18 months for com-
plaints to come to human rights commission in Cook County due to investigatory
delays).
157. See, e.g., Karen Davis, Agency Struggles With Bias Caseload, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., June 27, 1994, at 1-D (characterizing backlog of Rhode Island Commission For
Human Rights as "horrendous").
158. See, e.g., Rick Brand, New Life For Rights Agency?, NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 1993
(describing impact of budget cuts on the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission).
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cases, years later. Furthermore, even in cases where the complain-
ant has the ability to wait for a resolution, unless the Commission
acts quickly, the landlord or seller, by renting the apartment or sell-
ing the house to someone else, may make it impossible for relief to
be granted.
The causes of delay include inefficient case processing, increased
workload and budget cutbacks. Over the years, allegations have
frequently been made that the Commission's procedures are cum-
bersome and inefficient. 159 In 1995, the Commission took a
number of steps to increase its productivity. Intensive case man-
agement and increased use of conciliation have been credited with
doubling the number of completed investigations in fiscal year
1995. The average number of investigations closed per investigator
also increased from 3.7 in 1994 to 4.4 in 1995. According to the
Mayor's 1995 Management Report, the Commission's backlog was
reduced by 8%, from 3,737 cases in 1994 to 3,425 cases in 1995.
The introduction of a computerized case management system
designed by the Fund For The City of New York promises to fur-
ther streamline the Commission's procedures. The system permits
Commission personnel to enter information about complainants
into computers as part of their intake interviews. Complaints are
then automatically prepared and sent out with minimal delay. The
system should permit the Commission to track cases more carefully
and thereby manage its caseload better.
Inefficiency is certainly not the only reason for long delays in
case processing and lengthening administrative backlogs. Since it
was created forty years ago, the Human Rights Commission's man-
date has steadily expanded. Over the years, discrimination based
upon disability, marital status, sex, sexual orientation, family status,
marital status, HIV status, age and occupation have been added to
the original protected groups of race, color, creed and national ori-
gin. As the City Council adds protected groups to the Commis-
sion's agenda, it frequently does not increase funding or
manpower. In addition, at no point in this progression of protec-
tion has the Council, the Mayor or the Commission identified pri-
orities. Instead, each case is treated equally regardless of whether
it involves discrimination against a tenant because he is black or
because he is a lawyer. 6 '
159. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 113, at iv.
160. One group of complainants, HIV positive individuals, ordinarily receives expe-
dited treatment.
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In the face of this increased workload, the Commission has suf-
fered as its manpower has decreased and its funding has declined.
Although the City budgeted additional funds for the Commission
in fiscal year 1996,6 the overall level of funding is still substan-
tially below spending levels for 1994. In the present era of fiscal
austerity, it appears unlikely that the Human Rights Commission
will receive major new commitments from the City budget.
Even so, additional resources are potentially available to fund
administrative resolution of housing discrimination complaints.
Under the Fair Housing Act, HUD must refer cases of housing dis-
crimination to state and local human rights agencies if their sub-
stantive and procedural laws are substantially equivalent to the
Fair Housing Act.1 62 When HUD refers the cases to state and local
agencies under the Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) it
typically also provides financial assistance at the rate of $1,200 per
case resolved. At present, the New York City Human Rights Com-
mission is not eligible to participate in FHAP and receive federal
contract funds because its law has not been deemed to be substan-
tially equivalent.
The primary reason for the failure of the Human Rights Law to
meet HUD's standards is procedural. Under the Fair Housing Act,
once HUD determines probable cause exists to believe discrimina-
tion occurred, the complainant is given the choice of proceeding to
an administrative hearing or, instead, opting for judicial review of
the claims whereby he or she may receive punitive damages in ad-
dition to injunctive relief. If he or she chooses judicial review, the
government must represent the complainant at no cost. Under the
City's Human Rights Law, the complainant has no similar choice.
Once the Commission makes a probable cause ruling, the case pro-
ceeds to an administrative hearing in which the Commission's legal
staff represents the "public interest" rather than the injured party.
For the City to become eligible for FHAP funding, it must
amend its law to conform to these federal standards. As of No-
vember 1994, 26 states and 32 localities have done so. 163 In New
York, this could probably be achieved by allowing the complainant
to choose to be represented by attorneys from the Corporation
161. The authorized Fiscal Year 1996 budget for the Human Rights Commission is
8.2 million dollars. See CiTY OF NEW YORK, ADOPTED BUDGET-FISCAL YEAR 1996
4E (1995).
162. See supra text accompanying note 134.
163. See 59 FED. REG. 56086 (Nov. 10, 1994).
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Counsel's office or, alternatively, the Commission's enforcement
bureau.
In addition to complaints about delays and backlogs, human
rights commissions are also prime targets for criticism because the
problems they seek to redress are so deeply ingrained in American
society. Case by case adjudication of housing discrimination com-
plaints, while important, is unlikely to have the impact of a more
targeted and systemic approach to the problem. Indeed, through-
out the history of the Commission on Human Rights a tension has
existed between those who favored a system based upon resolving
individual complaints and one which is based upon systemic inves-
tigations by the Commission followed by prosecution. In 1965, a
former head of the Commission likened the case-by-case approach
to "trying to empty the ocean with a spoon."' 16  Although the
Commission has had some success with systemic investigations,
particularly the consent decrees obtained in the mid-1980s against
real estate brokers,165 since 1990, its role in initiating pattern and
practice investigations and litigation has been extremely limited.
The Commission's ability to conduct systemic investigations and
prosecutions is inhibited by several factors. In the early 1990s, the
Housing Bureau was subsumed into the Law Enforcement Bureau.
Therefore, given the overwhelming ratio of employment to housing
cases filed with the Commission, investigators have had little time
to develop expertise in investigating discriminatory housing prac-
tices. In addition, potential employees committed to open housing
issues may be dissuaded from accepting jobs at the Commission
because of their inability to specialize in fair housing enforcement.
A separate reason for the limited role of the Commission in sys-
temic investigations is that the Commission cannot, as a matter of
right, bring lawsuits in its own name in state and federal court. 166
The commissioners must instead rely upon the cooperation of the
Corporation Counsel's office to litigate pattern or practice cases.
Perhaps the greatest factor inhibiting the Human Rights Com-
mission from engaging in systemic investigations of discriminatory
housing practices is the crushing pressure of individual complaints.
164. See New Law Increases Powers of City Rights Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1965, at 40.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28 and 111-12.
166. Attorneys for the Human Rights Commission may file civil actions only if they
have been designated to do so by the Corporation Counsel. See NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE § 8-402(c).
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In a world of static or declining budgets, 67 a decision to allocate
resources to pattern or practice litigation implies diverting funds
from individual claim processing and resolution with the resultant
lengthening of delays and backlogs.
One possible justification for such a shift in resources is
grounded in examining the comparative advantage of the Human
Rights Commission. For most complainants, alternative avenues of
individual redress exist. Any aggrieved individual can file a private
claim in federal or state court, provided that he or she can afford
the services of an attorney or can locate an attorney who will take
the case on a contingency basis. In addition, most complainants
who cannot file their own lawsuits have the option of filing their
claims with HUD or the New York State Division of Human
Rights. While it is true that each of these agencies have their own
problems with delays and backlogs, limited evidence suggests that
their case processing is at least as timely as the City's. 168
A local, as opposed to a state or federal, human rights agency,
however, is likely to have a comparative advantage in investigating
patterns or practices of housing discrimination. The first advantage
is informational. Close proximity to the sites where discriminatory
167. One simple or, perhaps simplistic, approach to this problem would be to argue
that the City should allocate additional resources to the Commission to enable it to do
both functions well. Although such a recommendation may fit my personal policy
preferences, I do not have sufficient information about other City programs to ana-
lyze adequately the trade-offs such a shift in resources would necessitate. Further-
more, additional resources would probably not eliminate the problem of backlogs in
individual case processing and the trade-off between individual and systemic enforce-
ment activities. If the Commission were to receive additional resources and improved
its record in handling individual complaints, it would likely attract an increased pro-
portion of new cases that would otherwise be filed with the Division of Human Rights
or HUD. This, in turn, would likely lead again to increased delays and backlogs and
the reemergence of trade-offs borne by scarcity.
168. According to the most recent annual report of the New York State Division of
Human Rights, the median case processing time in 1991-1993 was 20 months. From
1991-1993, the Division reduced the number of cases over two years old by 11.3%.
See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1991-1993 1-2
(1993). Furthermore, from March 1990 to October 1995, the total caseload of the
Division has fallen from 17,348 to 13,701. See New York State Division of Human
Rights, Total Caseload as of 31 March (1990-1995) (mimeograph dated October 1995,
on file with the author). According to a recent report by the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, the average number of days for cases filed with HUD to be
closed varied by type of closing. In 1993, cases which were administratively closed
took the shortest time-94 days on average. Cases for which HUD determined no
probable cause to exist took an average of 203 days to close and probable cause deter-
minations took an average of 592 days. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 48 (Sept.
1994).
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practices exist is likely to increase the flow of information from the
neighborhoods involved to the investigative agency.169 In addition,
to the extent that the investigators live in nearby areas, they can be
expected to have a greater understanding of local customs and
practices than outsiders. 170 Close proximity also enhances oppor-
tunities for the human rights agency to develop partnerships with
indigenous community groups and fair housing advocacy organiza-
tions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a state or federal
agency would be unlikely to commit substantial resources to a sus-
tained, targeted investigation dedicated to rooting out discrimina-
tory practices in just one jurisdiction. Instead, investigatory
resources are likely to be spread throughout the broader geo-
graphic boundaries of the state or nation so as to maintain a deter-
rent effect. 7'
Reorienting the New York City Human Rights Commission
from individual complaint processing to systemic investigations and
prosecutions would certainly not be costless. Complainants in cer-
tain protected groups, such as those discriminated against because
of their sexual orientation, alienage status or occupation, have no
administrative alternative to the Commission. For those unable to
obtain a lawyer, increased delays and case backlogs could well cre-
ate hardships. 72 One possible way to deal with this problem would
169. This informational advantage may be diluted if the Commission, as would be
expected, received a smaller share of individual complaints as a result of increased
case processing times. Nevertheless, the Commission would likely continue to receive
a substantial number of individual complaints, even if it shifted resources to systemic
investigations and prosecutions. In addition, cooperation between the Commission
and the New York State Division of Human Rights and HUD could provide similar
information about sources of discriminatory practices.
170. This advantage may imply a corresponding disadvantage. An investigator who
shares a similar culture with the discriminating parties may be less sensitive to, or
energetic in, uncovering illegal activities.
171. One comparative disadvantage of locating the responsibility of investigating
discriminatory housing practices in a local as compared to a state or federal agency is
the possibility of political interference. It is likely that mayors would be more sensi-
tive to pressure from neighborhoods opposed to public efforts to break down discrim-
inatory barriers than governors or presidents. This greater sensitivity to public
pressure might, in turn, weaken local enforcement efforts. To avoid this problem of
political interference, the Commission might choose to "contract out" systemic inves-
tigations to private, nonprofit organizations such as the Open Housing Center. For a
description of the Open Housing Center, see OPEN HOUSING CENTER, The Open
Housing Center (undated pamphlet on fie with the author).
172. Fewer resources devoted to individual case resolution would not, in the long
run, necessarily lead to increased delays and case backlogs. As information about
increased processing time became disseminated, many people who would otherwise
file complaints with the City Commission could be expected to file private lawsuits or
complaints with HUD or the New York State Division of Human Rights. The result-
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
be to grant complainants in these groups a priority in the Commis-
sion's case processing. Although such a procedure may cure the
problem of hardship among members of these protected classes, it
may nevertheless raise serious problems of equity.
In the end, a decision to shift the Commission's focus from indi-
vidual complaint resolution to systemic investigations and prosecu-
tions, at least with respect to housing discrimination must rest with
an evaluation of whether the benefits obtained outweigh the costs.
There are several reasons to believe that compared to the current
case-by-case approach, a strategy based on systemic investigations
and prosecutions would be more effective in fighting discrimination
in New York City. Fighting housing discrimination primarily
through resolving individual complaints effectively places the
agenda of the Human Rights Commission in the hands of individ-
ual complainants. A substantial number of these complaints will
be found to have no merit.173 Furthermore, because discrimination
is usually difficult or impossible for an individual tenant or home
buyer to identify, a large number of discriminatory actions will
never find their way onto the Commission's docket. Indeed, a re-
active system that relies upon individual complainants may make it
possible for the worst offenders to elude detection as minority
homeseekers, themselves, steer clear of neighborhoods or land-
lords that have a reputation for discrimination. 74
In contrast, systemic investigations and prosecutions can target
scarce enforcement dollars on neighborhoods or landlords that the
Commission identifies as posing the greatest probability of discrim-
ination and the greatest threat to integration. The City's experi-
ence with systemic investigations in the mid-1980s suggests that this
type of focused law enforcement effort can effectively change prac-
tices and benefit substantial numbers of New Yorkers.
Conclusion
In New York City, as well as in most major metropolitan areas of
the nation, the issues of housing discrimination and segregation
ing drop in caseload with the Human Rights Commission might then lead to shorter
administrative delays.
173. Of the 93 complaints filed between January 1992 and 1993 for which determi-
nations on the merits were made, the Commission found that no probable cause ex-
isted to believe that discrimination had occurred in 63 cases or 68% of the total.
174. Cf. Joseph P. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy In The Federal System: Propos-
als For A Better Use Of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1191 (1965) (stat-
ing that minority group members will usually restrict their employment applications
to businesses that already hire members of their group).
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have taken on tremendous importance. Studies have repeatedly
shown that the incidence of racial and ethnic discrimination is high,
contributing to residential segregation and the growth of concen-
trated poverty. Barriers to mobility based upon race or ethnicity
threaten to grow in importance over the next decade, primarily
among low income households, as government increasingly relies
upon housing vouchers and the private housing market.
New York City has led the nation in fighting housing discrimina-
tion. Its Fair Housing Practices Law, enacted in 1957, was the first
law in the nation to make discrimination in the private housing
market illegal. With varying levels of success, the New York City
Human Rights Commission has fought for equal opportunities in
housing for forty years. There is much to be proud of, but still
much more to accomplish.
